

Message Text

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 04768 01 OF 03 142007Z
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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 4768

EXDIS USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF JUNE 14, 1977
(SALT TWO -1222)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF JUNE 14, 1977.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, JUNE 14, 1977

I

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION WILL ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS OF
DEFINING THE HEAVY BOMBERS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION WITHIN THE
ESTABLISHED 2,400 OVERALL MAXIMUM LEVEL (ARTICLE II, PAR.3,
OF THE DRAFT).

AT PRESENT THIS ENTIRE PARAGRAPH IS BRACKETED. HOWEVER,
A CLOSE LOOK AT BOTH VERSIONS SHOWS THAT THEY CONTAIN POSI-
TIONS WHICH ARE SIMILAR IN CONTENT. THUS, THE SIDES AGREE
THAT THE AIRCRAFT WHICH WILL BE LIMITED UNDER THE AGREEMENT
BE SPECIFICALLY NAMED IN ITS TEXT. CURRENTLY FOR THE USSR
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 04768 01 OF 03 142007Z

THIS INCLUDES TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV, AND FOR THE U.S.,
B-52 AND B-1. THERE IS ALSO A COINCIDENCE OF VIEWS TO THE
EFFECT THAT THE QUESTION OF INCLUDING AIRCRAFT AMONG HEAVY
BOMBERS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSULTATION
BETWEEN THE SIDES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

AS FOR THE SOVIET MEDIUM BOMBER CALLED "BACKFIRE" IN

THE U.S., THE SOVIET SIDE HAS EXHAUSTIVELY SET FORTH AND SUBSTANTIATED THE WELL-KNOWN CONSIDERATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THIS BOMBER CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF LIMITATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ONGOING BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS.

IF OUR UNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT, IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE DRAFTING WORKING GROUP, A CERTAIN CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS HAS BECOME APPARENT WITH REGARD TO THE MEANING OF THE TERM "CHARACTERISTICS" AS APPLIED TO THE DEFINITION OF HEAVY BOMBERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS TO STATE THAT AS FOR THE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH WILL DEFINE HEAVY BOMBERS IN THE FUTURE, THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE TERM "CHARACTERISTICS" IS UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN THE COMBAT RANGE OF THE AIRCRAFT WITHOUT IN-AIR REFUELING, WHEN IT IS EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES FOR ONE COMBAT MISSION.

THUS, THE USE OF THE TERM "CHARACTERISTICS" IN ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, IN THE MEANING SET FORTH ABOVE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH NAMING THE SPECIFIC HEAVY BOMBERS--TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV FOR THE USSR, AND B-52 AND B-1 FOR THE U.S.-- PROVIDES OBJECTIVE CRITERIA, VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, WHICH MAKE IT POSSIBLE RELIABLY TO JUDGE PRECISELY WHICH AIRCRAFT OF THE SIDES MUST BE INCLUDED AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS IN THE FUTURE AND, CONSEQUENTLY, MUST BE LIMITED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE 2,400 AGGREGATE LEVEL ESTABLISHED BY THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING.

IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE WORKING GROUP COULD BEGIN REMOVING SECRET

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 04768 01 OF 03 142007Z

BRACKETS FROM ARTICLE II, PAR. 3.

NOW, ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ON THIS PROVISION OF THE DRAFT.

THE AIDE MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974, WHICH RECORDS THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN VLADIVOSTOK WITH RESPECT TO THE BASIC CONTENT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS--AND THIS UNDERSTANDING IS RECOGNIZED BY BOTH SIDES AS THE BASIS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT--STATES THAT THE 2,400 MAXIMUM AGGREGATE LEVEL INCLUDES "HEAVY BOMBERS, IF THE LATTER ARE EQUIPPED WITH BOMBS OR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE NOT EXCEEDING 600 KILOMETERS."

IN OBVIOUS CONTRAVENTION OF THIS AGREED PROVISION, IT IS SUGGESTED IN THE U.S. SIDE'S PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN THE WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, OF THE JOINT DRAFT TO INCLUDE AMONG HEAVY BOMBERS AIRCRAFT "HOWEVER CONFIGURED." IT IS

CLEAR THAT THIS IS A DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING, WHICH AFFECTS ITS PRINCIPLES. THUS, IT IS NOT A MATTER OF SECONDARY ISSUES, BUT OF PRINCIPLES, I.E., A MATTER IN WHICH IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO BE EXACTING AND STRICT.

THE QUESTION ARISES: WHAT DOES THE APPROACH EXPRESSED IN THE WORDS "TYPES OF AIRCRAFT HOWEVER CONFIGURED" MEAN IN PRACTICE?

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 04768 02 OF 03 142030Z
ACTION SS-25

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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 GENEVA 4768

EXDIS USSALTTWO

THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IS GIVEN IN THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION, AT THE MAY 31, 1977 MEETING AMONG OTHERS.

THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE AIMED AT ATTEMPTING TO INCLUDE SOVIET TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT AMONG THE HEAVY BOMBERS BEING LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT. IT IS CLEAR THAT UNDER CONDITIONS WHERE SUCH U.S. AIRCRAFT WOULD IN ESSENCE NOT BE LIMITED, THIS WOULD LEAD TO VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY ON WHICH, BY JOINT DECISION OF BOTH SIDES, THE NEW AGREEMENT WILL BE BASED. IN OTHER WORDS, THIS PROPOSAL IS AIMED AT OBTAINING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE; IT IS

IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE TO THIS.

MENTION HAS BEEN MADE HERE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF

CONVERTING SOVIET TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE
WARFARE AIRCRAFT INTO HEAVY BOMBERS.

BUT, AFTER ALL, THE EXISTING TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT IN THE USSR ARE NOT SOME
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 04768 02 OF 03 142030Z

SORT OF "VARIANTS" OF HEAVY BOMBERS. THEY ARE SPECIAL
MODIFICATIONS OF AIRCRAFT DESIGNED AND CONSTRUCTED TO CARRY
OUT QUITE SPECIFIC MISSIONS WHICH HAVE NOTHING IN COMMON
WITH THE MISSIONS FOR WHICH HEAVY BOMBERS ARE DESIGNED AND
CONSTRUCTED. THEREFORE, THE AFOREMENTIONED AIRCRAFT CANNOT
AS A PRACTICAL MATTER BE USED AS HEAVY BOMBERS OR ADAPTED
FOR SUCH USE.

IT IS ALSO QUITE OBVIOUS THAT CONVERSION INTO HEAVY
BOMBERS OF SUCH SPECIAL MODIFICATIONS OF AIRCRAFT AS SOVIET
TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT
WOULD BY NO MEANS BE ANY LESS COMPLICATED, BOTH FROM A
TECHNICAL STANDPOINT AND IN TERMS OF TIME, THAN, FOR EXAMPLE,
CONVERSION OF A U.S. KC-135 TANKER AIRCRAFT INTO A HEAVY
BOMBER.

THE VERY THOUGHT OF SUCH CONVERSION IS IRRATIONAL. IT
IS IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A SITUATION WHERE ONE SIDE OR THE
OTHER WOULD DECIDE TO GIVE UP TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT, THEREBY DAMAGING ITS OWN
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES.

AS FOR THE ASSERTIONS CONTAINED IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S
STATEMENT AT THE MAY 31, 1977 MEETING--THAT EXCLUSION OF
SOVIET TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
AIRCRAFT FROM THE 2,400 AGGREGATE LIMIT WOULD ALLEGEDLY
"UNDERMINE THE PURPOSE OF EQUAL AGGREGATES"--THIS, APART FROM
WHAT WAS SAID ABOVE, IS INCORRECT FROM A POLITICAL STANDPOINT
AS WELL. AFTER ALL, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, BOTH SIDES--THE
U.S., AS WELL AS THE USSR--ARE ENTERING INTO THE NEW AGREEMENT
NOT FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUBSEQUENTLY TRYING TO EXCEED THE
EQUAL AGGREGATE LEVELS BEING ESTABLISHED FOR THE NUMBERS
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF
SECURITY AND IN VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT ITSELF. ON THE
CONTRARY, THERE IS ALREADY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SIDES,
RECORDED IN ARTICLE XV OF THE JUNE 10, 1977 DRAFT AGREEMENT,
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PAGE 03 GENEVA 04768 02 OF 03 142030Z

IN THE FUTURE TO WORK TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING ON REDUCING

THESE MAXIMUM LEVELS.

IT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID HERE, AND THIS IS WELL KNOWN, THAT IN THE USSR AND U.S. ARMS DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT HISTORICALLY HAVE NOT PROCEEDED ALONG INDENTICAL PATHS AND THESE ARMS ARE BY NO MEANS MIRROR IMAGES OF EACH OTHER. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. ATTEMPTS TO IGNORE THE DISTINCTIVE PATTERN OF THE OBJECTIVE HISTORICAL PATHS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THIS FIELD, IN ORDER TO USE THIS DIFFERENCE TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, CANNOT BUT BE REGARDED AS RUNNING COUNTER TO THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

IN AN EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE II, PAR. 3, ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL ACCEPTABILITY, THE SOVIET SIDE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED ASSUMPTION OF MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS NOT TO CONVERT TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT INTO HEAVY BOMBERS.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE U.S. DELEGATION'S COMMENTS AT THE MAY 31, 1977 MEETING, I WOULD LIKE TO REMIND YOU OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH AGGREGATE NUMERICAL LEVELS, EQUAL FOR THE USSR AND THE U.S., FOR TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE AND ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT, BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE TERMS OF SUCH LIMITATIONS MUST BE THE SAME FOR BOTH SIDES.

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 04768 03 OF 03 142029Z
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 GENEVA 4768

EXDIS USSALTTWO

BOTH OF THESE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE REMAIN ON THE TABLE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

FURTHERMORE, AT THE JUNE 3, 1977 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION STATED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAS NO INTENTION OF CONVERTING ITS TANKER, RECONNAISSANCE OR ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AIRCRAFT INTO HEAVY BOMBERS. WE EXPECT THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION WILL MAKE A SIMILAR STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE U.S.

THE CONSIDERATIONS SET FORTH HERE CAN ALSO BE CONSIDERED FURTHER IN THE DRAFTING WORKING GROUP.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE DELEGATIONS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN IMPORTANT AND RESPONSIBLE WORK ON REACHING AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF APPROPRIATE FORMULATIONS FOR INCLUSION IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT UNDER PREPARATION. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS JOINT EFFORT, I WOULD LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE RECENT STATEMENT OF L. I. BREZHNEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, IN WHICH HE SAID:

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 04768 03 OF 03 142029Z

"FOR SEVERAL YEARS NOT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. WE BELIEVE THAT IMPORTANT RESULTS HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUING EVEN NOW. THEY ARE BASED ON THE WELL KNOWN VLADIVOSTOK UNDERSTANDING. WE ARE STRIVING FOR EARLY AND PRODUCTIVE CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS WILL BECOME POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, IF OUR PARTNERS DO NOT TRY TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THEMSELVES. WE WILL NOT ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WHICH COULD DAMAGE THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OUR ALLIES."

SUCH IS THE SOVIET UNION'S APPROACH. IT IS FROM THESE POSITIONS OF PRINCIPLE THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION APPROACHES THE WORK OF SEARCHING FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE FORMULATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS BEING CONSIDERED IN GENEVA. END STATEMENT.
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